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Regime Power and Peasant Protests*
MONICA ANDRIESCU
This article is part of a larger research project that comparatively explores the 
relationship between the nature of political regimes and the forms of state violence 
used against collective protests during 1933-1999 in Romania. The general argument 
is that the type of power of a political regime influences the level and type of violence 
it uses in situations of open conflict with segments of the society (in this case, 
participants in collective actions of protest). More specifically, in the case of non-
democratic regimes, (predominantly physical) violence used by the state against its 
contenders is higher in the early stages of regime consolidation. Once the regime is 
consolidated, its inherent institutionalization facilitates the use of other, more diluted 
forms of violence (e.g. psychological violence). The nature of regimes can thus be 
more thoroughly understood if researched in connection to their uses of power. 
The present article examines the reactions of the communist institutions and 
agents of government against peasant protests in the early stages of the collectivization 
process. I focus on a single case study, namely peasant riots in Arad county (July-
August 1949). The findings guide reflection on the features of the power and the 
associated forms of political violence that were displayed by the communist regime 
in its early phase of development (identified in the literature as a feature of the 
1947-1964 period). I thus place the analyzed case study in the wider context of the 
socialist transformation of agriculture and the general process of the communist’s 
regime consolidation and institutionalization1. I am to expand on existing (mostly 
historical) literature on this topic by focusing the analysis around concepts that have 
undeservedly been ignored thus far and which are briefly discussed below. 
According to Michael Mann, there are two types of power political elites use: 
despotic power and infrastructural power. Mann defines the former as “the range of 
actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized 
negotiation with civil society groups”, and the latter as ”the capacity of the state 
actually to penetrate civil society and to implement logistically political decisions 
throughout the realm”2. Combining these two dimensions of power, Mann proposes 
a typology: feudal states (low on both despotic and infrastructural power), imperial 
states (high on despotic, but low on infrastructural power), bureaucratic states (low 
1* An earlier version of this article was published in Romanian, in Vasile BOARI, Alexandru 
CÂMPEANU, Sergiu GHERGHINA (coord.), Proiectul uman comunist: de la discursul ideologic la 
realităţile sociale, Presa Universitară Clujeană, Cluj-Napoca, 2012, pp. 51-88.
1 These initial stages after power takeover are defined by Kenneth Jowitt as ”system-
building” and characterized by ”a desperate bid to gain authority”, in Revolutionary Breakthrough 
and National Development: The Case of Romania, 1944-1965, University of California Press, Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, 1971, p. 116.
2 Michael MANN, ”The Autonomous Power of the State”, Archives européennes de sociologie, 
vol. 25, 1984, pp. 185-213.
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on despotic, but high on infrastructural power), and authoritarian states (high on 
both dimensions). This typology does not, however, look at the different phases of 
development of the same regime, which produces variations in the type of power 
that is used at different points in time. Charles Tilly’s typology can fill this gap, by 
hypothesizing the relationship between regime capacity and the use of collective 
violence on its territory. Tilly argues that in low-capacity undemocratic regimes, there 
is a high level of collective violence; in high-capacity undemocratic regimes, on the 
other hand, there is a medium level of collective violence (because the regime forbids 
most or all protests and there is ”extensive involvement of state security forces in 
any public politics”)1. This classification looks primarily at how the existing political 
opportunities facilitate or deter collective protest. This article slightly shifts the angle 
of analysis and looks at what determines the establishment and development of these 
structural features: the type of power that elites rely on.
Although in non-democratic regimes that have high infrastructural powers the 
actions of agents of government are still carried out without negotiations with civil 
society, the regime can rely on the institutional ”infrastructure” it needs to implement 
decisions. In this way, it can be argued that once a non-democratic regime increases 
its infrastructural powers, it tends to decrease the use of physical violence against its 
contending ”subjects”. This process is facilitated because wider institutional reach 
into the territory endows the elites with more levers for exercising power (whereas 
in the initial period of consolidation, the state does not fully control its institutions, 
it has a limited reach over its territory, thereby finding the use of physical violence 
the most effective means of control). By extension, in the absence of institutionalized 
mechanisms that can be used to prevent or control collective protests, a less 
consolidated non-democratic regime will rely on the use of non-institutionalized and 
more physical violence to contain protest. Mann argues that despotic states 
”have rarely been able to hold on to such power for long [as] despotic achievements 
have usually been precarious in historic states because they have lacked effective 
logistical infrastructures for penetrating and co-ordinating social life”2. 
Therefore, ”a despotic state without strong infrastructural supports will only 
claim territoriality”3. Based on this, I argue that during the consolidation stages of 
the regime (from the late 1940s until the early 1960s), the Romanian communist elites 
exercised high despotic powers, but had low infrastructural capacities, which favored 
the use of a high level of physical violence against participants in peasant riots as the 
only means to secure control.
The consolidation of the communist regime in Romania was in many key aspects 
based on the institutionalization of the role and functions of coercive state institutions 
(Secret Police, Militia etc.) as the ”basis of state power”4. This process increased the 
regime’s infrastructural power (as defined by Mann). The characteristic nature of this 
power can be analyzed and explained through a careful analysis of one of the key 
1 Charles TILLY, The Politics of Collective Violence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2003, p. 47.
2 Michael MANN, ”The Autonomous Power...cit.”, pp. 185-213.
3 Ibidem.
4 Ibidem, p. 111.
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dimensions that characterize any modern state – the monopoly of the use of violence 
(legitimate or illegitimate)1. The meanings, motivations, justifications and methods 
for using violence show considerable variation across historical periods, geographical 
regions etc.2. As one of its sub-categories, political violence varies according to the 
historical and social context in which it develops and the nature of the relationship 
between power configuration and the characteristics of protest groups. Invariably, 
however, political violence arises in situations of conflict between state and society. 
It ”involves the use of physical force and causes injury to the opponent in order to 
achieve political objectives”3. In this article, I expand the definition to objectives that 
are not necessarily political, but which are perceived or framed by the elites as a 
threat to their authority (i.e. protests that have at their origins dissatisfaction with 
socio-economic decisions that are implemented, but which do not directly contend 
the political order). To an understanding of political violence as only involving 
physical connotations, I add Johan Galtung’s structural dimension of psychological 
violence, which he defines as the ”violence that works on the soul”, which includes 
”lies, brainwashing, indoctrination of various kinds, threats […] that serve to decrease 
mental potentialities”4. Although not analyzed at length in this article, this dimension 
of violence is useful for understanding the development of the communist regime in 
Romania during its later, institutionalized stages. 
Along these lines, the state can be defined as a 
”field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by 1) 
the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory which is a 
representation of the people bounded by that territory, and 2) the actual practices 
of its multiple parts”5. 
Joel S. Migdal argues that states ”are shaped by two elements: image and 
practice”6. These elements can be ”overlapping and reinforcing or contradicting and 
mutually destructive”7. The first element – image – 
”implies perception […] the perception of the state by those inside and outside its 
acclaimed territory as the chief and appropriate rule maker within its territorial 
boundaries […] the perception assumes a single entity that is fairly autonomous, 
unified and centralized”8.
1 As defined by Max WEBER, in The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Free Press, 
New York, 1964, p. 154.
2 A brief, yet comprehensive overview is captured by Peter IMBUSCH, ”The Concept of 
Violence”, in Wilhelm HEITMEYER, John HAGAN (eds.), International Handbook of Violence 
Research, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003, pp. 13-39. 
3 Donatella DELLA PORTA, Social Movements, Political Violence and the State. A Comparative 
Analysis of Italy and Germany, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2nd edition, 2006.
4 Johan GALTUNG, ”Violence, Peace, and Peace Research”, Journal of Peace Research, 
vol. 6, no. 3, 1969, pp. 167-191.
5 Joel S. MIGDAL, State in Society. Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute 
One Another, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 15-16. 
6 Ibidem, p. 16.
7 Ibidem.
8 Ibidem.
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The second one – practice – represents ”the routine performances of state actors 
and agencies” which ”may reinforce the image of the state or weaken it”1. These two 
elements cast a ”dual view” of the state in Migdal’s understanding: 
 ”The corporate, unified dimension of the state – its wholeness – exposed 
in its image, and one that dismantles this wholeness in favor of examining the 
reinforcing and contradictory practices and alliances of its disparate parts”2.
Migdal’s definition of these two elements of a state’s power complements Mann’s 
typology and is useful for the purposes of this article. It helps separate between the 
powerful despotic image the communist elites were aiming to project starting with 
the late 1940s and the practice that shaped a weaker and contrasting reality, due to 
internal inconsistencies, limited infrastructural reach and ”loosely connected parts 
or fragments, frequently with ill-defined boundaries between them”3. Exploring 
the institutional ”realm of action” as a ”critical component of the center” which 
”implements the values of the center throughout society” is essential to explaining 
how authority is exercised in a state4. The analysis thus framed helps to look into 
possible answers to questions regarding the role of institutions in shifting the balance 
between the types of power elites use at different times in the development of a 
political regime, as well as into the social changes they determine in the process. 
I analyze the ”regulatory function”5 of violence by looking at the decisions of 
party elites and the actions of the state security institutions (with a focus on their 
local agents). Peter Imbusch separates between direct violence (used by agents), 
institutional violence (employed by institutions) and structural violence (enacted 
through structures)6. This distinction is useful because it helps explain the relationship 
between the predominant form of power of the communist regime in its early stages 
of development (highly despotic, but low on infrastructural reach) and the forms of 
violence it engaged in (a mixture of brutal physical violence and ”softer” surveillance 
techniques, with the balance tipping in favor of the former). 
Informed by this conceptual framework, the article explores the mechanisms 
of political violence employed by institutions and agents of government against 
participants in peasant riots in the summer of 1949 in Romania. The reactions to what 
were perceived to be ”subversive activities” of the peasants illustrate the repressive 
function of one of the institutions directly involved in the communist state-building 
process: the Secret Police. The actions that were taken against the protesters serve to 
illustrate the type of power the regime used in the early phases of its development 
and the purposes for which it used it. 
I rely on existing secondary literature7, published documents and documents 
identified in the archives held by the Council for Studying the Secret Police Archives 
1 Ibidem.
2 Ibidem, p. 22.
3 Ibidem.
4 Ibidem.
5 Peter IMBUSCH, ”The Concept of Violence”, cit., p. 24. 
6 Ibidem, p. 26. 
7 Anale Sighet 2: Instaurarea comunismului – între rezistenţă şi represiune, ed. Romulus 
Rusan, Fundaţia Academia Civică, Bucureşti, 1995; Anale Sighet 7: Anii 1949-1953 – Mecanismele 
terorii, ed. Romulus Rusan, Fundaţia Academia Civică, Bucureşti, 1999; Anale Sighet 8: Anii 
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(hereinafter ACNSAS)1. The article outlines the initial stages in the process of 
collectivization (until 1956), analyzes the mechanisms of state violence against some 
of the participants in the riots, and points to the specific measures of reorganization 
of the Secret Police as a result of peasant riots. 
THE INITIAL STAGES OF THE COLLECTIVISATION PROCESS: 
POLITICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS (1949-1956)
The socialist transformation of agriculture was formally launched at the plenary 
meeting of the Central Committee (CC) of the Romanian Workers’ Party (PMR) during 
3-5 March 1949. Under the false pretext of liberation from the ”exploitation of kulaks”, 
the regime officially began the process of suppression of individual ownership of 
land. Its justification was that 
”kulaks consume only a small part of their products, while the rest goes 
to speculation on the market [while] in the context of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, a process of change in the formation of the internal market occurs, 
[…] in the sense of the abolition of the anarchy which characterizes the capitalist 
market and its replacement with a new organization”2.
The role of the reorganization of agriculture in shaping the new social order is 
thus confirmed. The Romanian communists took on to replicate the Soviet model. 
Marking its scale, the Romanian leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, set forth the key 
axes of the process: the establishment of national and local institutional structures 
(collective agricultural households – GAC, state agricultural households – GAS, and 
stations of cars and field engines – SMT) the application of persuasion strategies by 
local party activists and the use of propaganda directed against the kulaks (the ”class 
enemy”). Due to the extent of territory where collectivization had to be implemented 
and the regime’s uncertainties of how to go about it, the first envisaged stage was to 
pilot the establishment of collective agricultural households (GAC) only in certain 
areas, to test for possible problems. These first households were to be established 
”only with the free consent of the peasants”3, taking into account certain criteria, and 
their multiplication was going to happen 
1954-1960 – Fluxurile şi refluxurile stalinismului, ed. Romulus Rusan, Fundaţia Academia Civică, 
Bucureşti, 2000; Dan CĂTĂNUŞ, Octavian ROSKE (coord.), Colectivizarea agriculturii în România. 
Represiunea (1949-1953), Institutul Naţional pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, Bucureşti, 2004; 
IDEM (coord.), Colectivizarea agriculturii în România. Dimensiunea politică, vol. I and II, Institutul 
Naţional pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, Bucureşti, 2000, 2005 etc.
1 The translation in English of the documents belongs to the author of this article (including 
the translation of documents quoted in secondary literature). 
2 Report of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers’ Party, 
presented by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej at the plenary reunion of 3-5 March 1949 (fragment), in 
Octavian ROSKE, Dan CĂTĂNUŞ (coord.), Colectivizarea agriculturii în România: Dimensiunea 
politică, 1949-1953, vol. I, cit., pp. 57-58.
3 Octavian ROSKE, Dan CĂTĂNUŞ, ”Studiu introductiv”, in IDEM (coord.), Colectivizarea 
agriculturii în România: Dimensiunea politică, 1949-1953, vol. I, cit., p. 18.
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”as the growth of socialist industry was to occur, which would then be able 
to endow socialist agriculture with improved agricultural machinery, as the 
agriculturalists were going to become capable of running such a collective farm 
and as the awareness of the working peasants concerning the superiority of and 
necessity for collective farms would increase”1.
The seeming initial caution of the Communist Party was equal to the extent of 
the huge proportions of the commitment it was undertaking: 
 ”Solving the peasant problem is one of the most difficult tasks of the 
proletarian dictatorship […] the main task of our work in the countryside is the 
restriction of capitalist exploitation and the preparation of the conditions for the 
socialist organization of agriculture”2.
This cautious attitude was in contradiction with the communist authorities’ 
issuing two legal acts of key importance to the process of collectivization. The death 
penalty was introduced by Law no. 16/1949, thereby punishing actions considered to 
be ”crimes”, including ”treason [...] and bringing harm to state power” (Article 1b), 
”setting on fire or destruction in any manner of industrial or agricultural products, 
or forests” (Article 2c), ”acts of terror committed by individuals or groups, by any 
means, and the spread of germs or poisonous substances”; in the same manner ”the 
formation of groups, for terrorist or sabotage purposes” were punished (Article 3)3. 
Decree no. 83/1949 – amending Law no. 187/1945 – provided for ”the transferal to the 
state of bourgeois estates”, together with associated movable goods. Penalties for 
those who ”prevent or attempt to thwart expropriation [...]” were 5 to 15 years of 
forced labor and confiscation of property4. Another important legislative item was 
Decree no. 183/1949, which stipulated very harsh sanctions such as ”correctional prison 
from 1 to 12 years and a fine from 10 000 to 100 000 lei” for economic misdemeanors5. 
Other penalties were also very harsh, including sanctions of ”5 to 15 years of forced 
labor and a fine of 50 000-200 000 lei” for ”[…] hiding, destroying or distorting goods 
or merchandise [...]”6.
1 Report of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers’ Party, 
presented by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej at the plenary reunion of 3-5 March 1949 (fragment), in 
Octavian ROSKE, Dan CĂTĂNUŞ (coord.), Colectivizarea agriculturii în România: Dimensiunea 
politică, 1949-1953, vol. I, cit., pp. 65-66.
2 Resolution of Plenary Reunion of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers’ regarding the 
tasks of the party concerning the forging of the alliance between the working class and the peasant workers 
and with a view to the socialist transformation of agriculture, 3-5 March 1949, in Dorin DOBRINCU, 
Constantin IORDACHI (eds.), Ţărănimea şi puterea. Procesul de colectivizare a agriculturii în 
România (1949-1962), Polirom, Iaşi, 2005, p. 101. 
3 Law no. 16/1949 for the sanctioning of crimes that threaten state security and the development 
of national economy, published in the Official Bulletin no. 12/15 January 1949, in Octavian 
ROSKE, Florin ABRAHAM, Dan CĂTĂNUŞ (coord.), Colectivizarea agriculturii în România: 
Cadrul legislativ, 1949-1962, Institutul Naţional pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, Bucureşti, 2007, 
pp. 83-84.
4 Decree no. 83/2 March 1949 for with additional provisions to Law no. 187/1945, in Ibidem, 
pp. 86-87.
5 Decree no. 183/1949 for the punishment of economic crimes, in the Official Bulletin, no. 25 
of 30 April 1949, in Ibidem, pp. 89-90.
6 Decree no. 183/30 April 1949 regarding economic crimes, Art. 4, par. d), in Ibidem, p. 90.
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The initial ”caution” of the elites was to disappear a year later, when it was 
decided that the voluntary adhesion of the peasants was no longer a guiding principle 
in forming the collective agricultural households. Thus, in 1950, the agricultural policy 
changed its initial direction. The new strategy’s objective was to ”boost” peasant 
entries in the collective agricultural structures. The ”incentives” that could lead to 
such actions from the farmers who were losing their land were often coercive. Council 
of Ministers’ Decision no. 1154/26 October 1950 established the legal parameters of the 
communist regime’s arbitrary power to deploy citizens from ”crowded centers” (such 
as Bucharest and an area of 20 km around it, Braşov, Ploieşti, Cluj, Oradea, Timişoara 
etc.) and to ”establish mandatory residence in any location”1. Through Decision 
no. 344/15 March 1951, the authorities were entitled to decide on 
”the displacement and relocation from any location [...] of people who […] harm 
the building of socialism in the Romanian People’s Republic [...], such as those 
who commit acts of sabotage, oppose the enforcement of laws and measures of 
state bodies, spread news that discredit the regime of popular democracy and 
other deeds of a similar kind”2.
The reality shaped by peasant resistance, the abuses of the agents of government 
and the arising problems of implementation was very different from ideological 
motivations and political planning. This resulted in a less intensive collectivization 
campaign in 1951. The minutes of the Central Committee of the Romanian Worker’s 
Party of March 5, 1951 transmitted to the local party agents that there would be 
”penalties ranging up to exclusion from the party and criminal trials for anyone 
who forced peasants to join collective farms”3. The Central Committee Decision of 
September 18, 1951 recorded that ”in addition to [...] undeniable success in the socialist 
construction in the villages, there were also serious distortions and deviations from 
the party line”4. Furthermore, it was stated that:
 ”During the year 1950, some former county committees […] running after 
quantitative success, bureaucratically planned and forced the growth rhythm of 
collective farms, going as far as organizing competitions. In their search for large 
numbers, the local party agents grossly defied the indications of the plenary 
of the Central Committee of the party, which showed that at the foundation 
of collective farms to be established must stand the principle of free consent of 
the peasant workers, as a result of continuous political work of the Party and 
mass organizations. In some cases, local party activists used coercion methods 
1 Decision no. 1154/26 October 1950 of the Council of Ministers of the People’s Republic of 
Romania, in Ibidem, p. 169. 
2 Decision no. 344/ 15 March 1951 of the Council of Ministers of the People’s Republic of 
Romania, in Ibidem, p. 197.
3 In Robert LEVI, ”Primul val al colectivizării: politici centrale şi implementare regională, 
1949-1953”, in Dorin DOBRINCU, Constantin IORDACHI (eds.), Ţărănimea şi puterea…cit., 
p. 75.
4 Decision of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers’ Party of 18 September 1951 
regarding work related to the establishment of collective agricultural households, in Octavian ROSKE, 
Dan CĂTĂNUŞ (coord.), Colectivizarea agriculturii în România: Dimensiunea politică, 1949-1953, 
vol. I, cit., p. 247.
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in the process of forming collective farms, which were not in agreement with 
our party’s line of action [...] Only the peasants’ deep conviction about the great 
advantages of collective farm can serve as a basis for the creation of truly lasting 
households”1.
Going beyond the ideological form of discourse, one can observe that far from 
being unacquainted with the ”coercive methods” they challenged rhetorically, the 
communist authorities acknowledged their inability to actually fully – or even 
partially – control the realities on the ground (including local agents of government 
themselves). This points to a low level of infrastructural power the regime had in 
those years. Aware the danger of extensive use of coercive means at a time when the 
power of the regime was not consolidated, the Central Committee decided to replace 
them by using a strategy of persuasion, coupled with intense propaganda measures, 
deciding that ”any method of coercion, of economic or administrative pressure to 
determine the peasant workers into entering collective farms will be combated with 
determination”2.
Decree no. 131/June 18, 1952 allowed a renewed legal offensive against peasants, 
introducing the notion of ”forced requisitioning” of agricultural products undelivered 
on time and in the amount required by the quotas, establishing that 
”non-compliance with the obligation of collective farms and citizens to deliver 
[...] agricultural products subject to collection, brings [...] a liability that consists 
in mandatory compliance by way of judicial order through the payment of a civil 
fine [...]”3.
Coercive provisions were increased in the more elaborate Decision no. 1554/22 
August 1952 by the legal sanctioning of deportation to labor colonies. The Decision 
indicated ”the more active resistance of hostile elements” and incriminated several 
categories: those who ”spread alarmist, biased, hostile rumors”; ”verbally abuse the 
Romanian Workers’ Party [...]”; ”instigate racial and chauvinist manifestations”; 
”instigators to insubordination or failure to comply with orders”; ”reactionary 
elements or former exploiters”; ”active cadres of the former fascist parties and 
bourgeois-landlord groups”4. It is important to note that these criteria will be found 
in most of the charges brought against those who resisted the collectivization process. 
Many court motivations of sentences would appeal to the Criminal Code (Article 209) 
and invoke ”conspiracy against the social order”.
Decree no. 6/1950 of the Council of Ministers of the Romanian People’s Republic5 
should be correlated with Decision no. 1554/1952, because the former legalized the 
1 Ibidem, p. 248.
2 Ibidem, p. 257.
3 Decree no. 131/18 June 1952 published in the Official Bulletin, no. 30/ 18 June 1952, in 
Octavian ROSKE, Florin ABRAHAM, Dan CĂTĂNUŞ (coord.), Colectivizarea agriculturii în 
România: Cadrul legislativ, 1949-1962, cit., p. 296.
4 Decision no. 1554 of the Council of Ministers of the People’s Republic of Romania, 
22 August 1952 regarding the establishment of work colonies, obligatory residence and work 
batallions, in Ibidem, p. 297-298. 
5 Decree no. 6/1950 for the establishment of work units, issued by the Chair of the Grand National 
Assembly of the People’s Republic of Romania on 13 January 1950, Ibidem, pp. 118-119. 
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existence of ”work units”, while the second established the creation of ”labour 
colonies, forced settlement and labor battalions”. The concrete consequences of this 
type of approach of the relationship between state and society – which proves the 
incapacity of the communist regime to control all the levers of the process that it 
launched – can be quantified under the large number of arrests and imprisonment 
resulting from repressive practices that led to prison overcrowding. By consequence, 
the number of peasants who could work the land was diminished, and increased 
agricultural production remained an unfulfilled goal:
 ”We concluded that for a number of reasons the process unfolded frantically, 
thousands of people were arrested who should not have been arrested and 
especially working peasants, who are the majority, more than the kulaks [...] 
Văcăreşti prison is full, prisoners sleep in the yard, they do not have enough 
space, something awful is happening there, something unimaginable”1.
In the case of the collectivization process, external factors were as important 
as domestic ones in the decisions taken by the communist authorities in Romania. 
On the one hand stands the internal economic conditioning, and on the other hand 
the political changes occurring in the USSR after Stalin’s death. Both ought to be 
considered. In the summer of 1953, Dej stated that 
”there was a miconception on our side […] we should have established such 
a scale in developing the country’s economy on branches and within those 
branches, that would suit a long-term process, not we have designed it, on a 
short term basis”2.
Dej also stated that ”there must be an end to the mistakes [meaning] to introduce 
a serious policy of curbing rather than of elimination”3. The constant parameter 
remained the fact that agricultural production needed to increase significantly. Once 
again, one can notice considerable quenching of anti-kulak rhetoric, previous abuses 
being assigned to ”deviant” party elements. On the background of de-stalinization 
in the communist camp, collectivization remained a major concern for the Romanian 
Communist leaders: 
 ”The main tasks of the party in the second five-year plan regarding the 
socialist transformation of agriculture are [...] increasing the political and 
organizational work with a view to creating, at a faster pace, new agricultural 
and household collective association, respecting nevertheless the free consent 
of peasant workers; strengthening and developing existing collective farms and 
agricultural associations”4.
1 Gheorghe GHEORGHIU-DEJ, Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of 
the Romanian Workers’ Party of 19 November 1952, in Octavian ROSKE, Dan CĂTĂNUŞ (coord.), 
Colectivizarea agriculturii în România: Dimensiunea politică, 1949-1953, vol. I, cit., p. 313.
2 IDEM, Minutes of the plenary reunion of the Central Committee, in Octavian ROSKE, Dan 
CĂTĂNUŞ (coord.), Colectivizarea agriculturii în România: Dimensiunea politică, 1953-1956, 
vol. II, cit., p. 108.
3 Minutes of the plenary reunion of the Central Committee, 5 August 1953, in Ibidem, p. 94.
4 Activity Report of the Central Committee, presented by Ghe. Gheorghiu-Dej at the 2nd 
Congress of the Romanian Workers’ Party (fragment), in Ibidem, p. 323.
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The new indicators established in the Plenary meeting in December 1956 
introduced the abolition of ”mandatory quotas for wheat-rye, corn, sunflower and 
other grains (barley, oats, beans, peas), potatoes, hay and milk” from the 1st January 
19571. The poor harvest of 1956 was an additional reason for the ”relaxation” of the 
pace of collectivization, with the objective to ”strengthen [...] the alliance between 
the working class and the working peasantry” through ”the practice of such prices 
[which] would lead to incentives for agricultural producers […] to increase global 
production and the production of goods”2. This measure had the ideological objective 
of consolidating the power of the regime in a period when its weaknesses had been 
exacerbated by contingent events. There was also an economic objective: increased 
agricultural production.
The collectivization process was again accelerated beginning 1957, while the 
number of peasants who were arrested and sentenced many years in prison for acts 
considered as crimes increased again as compared with 19563. There were peasant 
riots after 1957, for example in the county of Vrancea (Vadu Roşca), Olt (Vâlcele), 
Dâmboviţa (Dobra), Argeş (Mozăceni Deal), but they were limited in scale and 
outcomes. 
Following this review of the first stages of collectivization, the next section looks 
into short and long-terms measures taken against the peasants who participated in 
the riots and their families; it also examines some of the measures taken to consolidate 
and expand the functions of the Secret Police as a direct consequence of the riots.
THE PEASANTS AND THE REGIME: 
THE RIOTS IN ARAD (JULY-AUGUST 1949)
In the summer of 1949 collective peasant protests occurred in several locations 
in the counties of Arad, Bihor, Botoşani and Suceava. According to existing research, 
such protests took place in 7 cities in Arad and in 18 localities in Bihor county. A year 
later, in the summer of 1950, there were repeated riots in Vlaşca County (in Ciuperceni, 
Tudor Vladimirescu, Siliştea, Baciu, Sârbenii de Jos, Sârbenii de Sus, Corbii Mari, 
Ghimpaţi – Udeni etc.). This section explores the peasant riots in Arad in the summer 
of 1949 and the communist authorities’ reactions of them by illustrating the range of 
the violent mechanisms used to repress opposition. 
Short-Term Measures: Killings and Arrests
The alleged ”counterrevolutionary actions” of this type were mostly reduced by 
the communist propaganda to the status of ”hostile activities of the kulaks”. Those 
identified as the leaders of the rebellions received the stigma of reactionary elements 
1 Draft of Action Plan, 25 December 1956, in Ibidem, pp. 386-387. 
2 Ibidem, p. 387.
3 According to numbers in Secret Police files, in 1956, 705 peasants were arrested and 
convicted, and for the following three years, their number grew to 1308, 1829 and 1499, quoted 
in Octavian ROSKE, Dan CĂTĂNUŞ, ”Colectivizarea agriculturii: Represiunea totală, 1957-
1962”, Arhivele Totalitarismului, vol. IV, no. 21, 1998, p. 215.
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that instigated the poor or middle peasants to protest actions and disobedience against 
party directives, thus becoming a threat to state security. In the case of the protests in 
the Apateu, Somoşcheş, Berechiu and Sepreuş villages in Arad (July-August 1949) – 
where the riots broke out simultaneously – repression manifested itself through the 
violent intervention of Militia troops, platoons of guards and Secret Police battalions. 
This deployment of armed forces was clearly disproportionate, as the peasants were 
mainly using agricultural tools as ”weapons”. Their resistance was ended abruptly 
after a few dozens of hours after the breakout of the protests. 
The responsibility for organizing peasant riots in the northern counties (including 
Arad) in the summer of 1949 was placed on ”reactionary elements” and ”kulaks” 
almost without exception, although many peasants who participated could not be 
classified as such: 
 ”To prevent the State Plan in the agricultural sector regarding the completion 
of grain collections, reactionary forces tried to organize a series of events that in 
some regions culminated in rebellions […] this action did not occur by chance, 
and did not have a local character, but has been prepared, organized and led by 
certain reactionary elements who tried to expand it”1.
Identifying the ”instigators and the leaders of the kulak actions” was the first 
step towards the ”liquidation of counterrevolutionary actions”2. The actions of those 
held responsible for the outbreak and development of the protests were deemed as 
”conspiracy against social order and the security of the people”3. For ideological 
reasons, the communists sought to blame ”subversive organizations” for plotting to 
undermine state security through the riots: 
 ”The counterrevolutionary actions of the kulaks in the counties of Bihor and 
Arad were not spontaneous, but organized activities, prepared for a long time by 
the elements belonging to subversive organizations”4.
There was disproportionate use of violence aimed to ”stifle the rebellion and 
prevent its expansion in surrounding regions, [and] the provision of threshing and 
1 Account concerning the operations carried aut to establish order in the regions where 
rebellions occurred from Arad-Bihor-Sălaj counties, no. 31.721/ 6 August 1949, Ministry for 
Internal Affairs, Troops Commandament, 1st Unit, in ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, File 15, 
”Counterrevolutionary kulak actions 1948-1949”, The Division of Security Police, File nr. 5628.
Sp, booklet no. 1, ff. 158-165.
2 Informative study on the counterrevolutionary kulak actions from Bihor-Arad counties, 
12 August 1949, reproduced in Dan CĂTĂNUŞ, Octavian ROSKE (coord.), Colectivizarea 
agriculturii în România. Represiunea (1949-1953), cit., p. 115.
3 ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, Dosar 560, vol. 1, RPR – Ministry of Internal Affairs – 
Operative Archives – Subversive organizations and groups, Apateu commune –Arad county, Record 
of proceedings from 17 Octombrie 1949, issued by the General Unit of the People’s Security, 
f. 314.
4 Synthesis on peasant rebellions in Bihor – Arad, 12 August 1949, Informative study on 
counterrevolutionary kulak actions from Bihor – Arad, in Dan CĂTĂNUŞ, Octavian ROSKE (coord.), 
Colectivizarea agriculturii în România. Represiunea (1949-1953), cit., pp. 104-118.
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harvest collections in normal conditions”1. During peasant riots, the degree of peasant 
violence was relatively low compared to that used by the agents of government. Often 
spontaneous, these protests were characterized by a type of ”unspecialized”2 violence 
that needs to be related to the economic, social and cultural context of Romania in 
those years (lack of peasant literacy, means of communications across localities and 
regions etc.). With a view to ”restoring order” in the villages where peasant riots 
occurred, police bodies resorted to on-spot executions of some of those that were 
identified as the ”instigating heads of rebellion”. The purpose was to discourage the 
peasants and contain the protest from developing further. Documents attest to the 
killing of 4 peasants in Sepreuş, 2 in Somoşcheş, 3 in Apateu and 1 in Berechiu3. 
Executions were followed by the operations of identification of all those who had 
taken part in the ”rebellions” with the mission to ”restore order and peace in all 
regions, eliminating the possibility of expansion of acts of rebellion and turmoil 
[...], persuade the population on a clear political line, causing it to follow orders 
concerning the proceedings regarding collection”4. Secret Police documents attest the 
arrest of 57 peasants in Sepreuş, 49 in Somoşcheş, 19 in Berechiu and 22 in Apateu5. 
The families of those who were executed, counting a total of a few dozen members, 
were relocated. The remaining ”enemies of the people” who were suspected of having 
taken part in the protests were arrested or placed under surveillance. Secret Police 
documents recorded 78 ”instigators” of the riot in Sepreuş (Arad), considered by the 
repressive forces as ”organizers” and ”leaders of agitators, gross rebels”6. According 
to the same documents, 22 individuals were arrested in Apateu, 18 in Berechiu, 
10 in Moţiori and 4 in Somoşcheş7. Approximately thirty peasants were deported 
1 ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, File 15, RPR – Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
”Counterrevolutionary kulak actions 1948-1949”, Unit of the Security Police, File no. 5628.Sp, 
Booklet no. 1, Account on establishing order in the regions with peasant unrest in the Arad-Bihor-
Sălaj counties no. 31.721/6 August 1949, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Troops Commandament, 
Section I, ff. 161.
2 Donatella DELLA PORTA, Social Movements, Political Violence and the State: A Comparative 
Analysis of Italy and Germany, cit., p. 4.
3 According to telegram no. 11/20853-8 of 4 August 1949, sent by the Regional Unit of 
the Security in Timişoara to the General Unit of the People’s Security Bucharest, in Teodor 
STANCA, ”Răscoalele ţărăneşti din 1949 din judeţul Arad, reflectate în documentele organelor 
de represiune”, Analele Sighet, Anii 1949-1953: Mecanismele Terorii, vol. 7, ed. Romulus Rusan, 
Fundaţia Academia Civică, Bucureşti, 1999, pp. 679-670.
4 Account on establishing order in the regions with peasant unrest in the Arad-Bihor-Sălaj 
counties, no. 31.721/6 August 1949, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Troops Commandament, 
Section I, in ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, File 15, RPR – Ministry of Internal Affairs – 
”Counterrevolutionary kulak actions1948-1949”, Unit of Security Police, File no. 5628.Sp, 
Booklet no. 1, ff. 160-165.
5 According to telegram no. 11/20853-8 of 4 August 1949, in Teodor STANCA, “Răscoalele 
ţărăneşti din 1949 din judeţul Arad...cit.”.
6 Nominal tables of individuals instigating to rebelion identified and detained from 
Sepreuş commune, Arad, 3 August 1949, in Dan CĂTĂNUŞ, Octavian ROSKE (coord.), 
Colectivizarea agriculturii în România. Represiunea (1949-1953), cit., pp. 76-79.
7 Nominal tables  of individuals instigating to rebelion identified and detained from 
Sepreuş commune, Arad, 3 August 1949, in Ibidem, pp. 79-82.
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following the investigations of the Secret Police and the Militia, as a consequence of 
their participation in the riots in Arad county1.
The situation in Arad county is presented in the Secret Police records as 
follows:
 ”In four villages there were aggressive protests. In other 5 communes 
there was also large-scale unrest, without aggression having occurred […] all 
9 communes that experienced protests are occupied by the army. A total of 112 
instigators were arrested, among which 10, while trying to escape the escort, 
were suppressed. The families of the 10 [people mentioned above], 33 people in 
total, were evacuated”2.
As follows, the repressive mechanisms were also used against the families of those 
who participated in the riots: evacuation or dislocation actually meant deportation. 
For example, a report signed by representatives of the Militia and the Secret Police 
drafted in August 1951 shows that six families from Sepreuş village were deported3. 
The situation is similar for Somoşcheş and Apateu villages, where a number of three, 
respectively four families were deported4. Two years after the riots, the communist 
authorities find that ”dislocations that were made [...] during the peasant unrest 
that took place had the effect of improving the state of mind in [these] communes, 
while producing panic among the hostile elements and fear among the wealthier 
citizens”5.
To serve ideological purposes and to legitimize the repressive action of the 
Militia and Secret Police against peasants, the spontaneous nature of the protests 
was contested by the officials of the communist regime. Recognizing the riots had 
indeed been indeed spontaneous would have posed a serious legitimacy problem. 
Scapegoats were identified, whose actions were justified by their social or political 
membership: 
 ”The events in Arad and Bihor show that in counter-revolutionary actions, 
the kulaks essentially rely on legionnary elements […] remnants of traditional 
parties, elements released from the army, on some of the village priests, especially 
the Catholics and some leaders of the Baptist denomination”6.
1 Tabel with deported peasants following the rebellions in Arad, document in Dan 
CĂTĂNUŞ, Octavian ROSKE (coord.), Colectivizarea agriculturii în România. Represiunea (1949-
1953), cit., pp. 82-83.
2 National Historical Archives, Central Committee Fund – Organizational Section, 
file 71/1949, ff. 1-10, quoted in Nicoleta IONESCU-GURĂ, Dimensiunea represiunii din România 
în regimul comunist: dislocări de persoane şi fixări de domiciliu obligatoriu, Corint, Bucureşti, 2010, 
p. 64.
3 Account of the situation in regions of Bihor, Arad, Baia Mare, Suceava and Sibiu, 
10 August 1951, in Ibidem, p. 318.
4 Ibidem.
5 Ibidem, p. 323.
6 Synthesis concerning peasant rebellion in Bihor – Arad, 12 August 1949, Informative study on 
counterrevolutionary kulak actions in Bihor – Arad counties, in Dan CĂTĂNUŞ, Octavian ROSKE 
(coord.), Colectivizarea agriculturii în România. Represiunea (1949-1953), cit., pp. 104-118.
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The investigation files drafted by the Secret Police justified the involvement of 
the middle and poor peasants as a result of the kulak’s use of ”propaganda methods, 
showing them that it is better to ask to be given their share of the goods following 
thrashing operations in nature, and not money”1. Peasants riots in Arad were therefore 
dismissed as 
”terrorist actions [that] had a well-defined purpose, in the sense of inciting the 
population to rebel against the given laws and orders, being led by kulaks, who 
did not kindly look to their lost positions through the measures that had been 
taken in connection with the gradual quota”2.
A number of 44 persons were accused of being either ”leaders of the rebellion”, 
to have taken ”an active part in events”, to have called out ”anti-democratic slogans”, 
to have ”stormed into public institutions”, of ”inciting the population to rebellion”. 
The Secret Police agents claimed that the rebellion of Apateu was ”led by agitators 
recruited by the kulaks”3. The documents also mention a number of 55 people who 
were investigated – ”poor and middle peasants” – that were ”trained either directly 
by the kulaks, or their committed agents”. They ”[took] part in the protests, without 
committing terrorist acts”4. Following investigations carried out over a period of two 
months, a number of Secret Police documents mention 27 people who 
”initiated, organized, participated and instigated to rebellion, [who] were 
armed and committed armed attacks against public authorities’ offices and 
their representatives, which they devastated, burned down, also instigating the 
inhabitants of Apateu commune to rebell”5.
The Secret Police’s official version concerning the 1949 riots in Arad county 
asserted the idea that ”the event did not occur by chance and did not have a local 
character, but was prepared, organized and led by reactionary elements who tried to 
expand it”6. The instructions received by the Secret Police forces deployed to ”restore 
order” were very clear: 
 ”Those who indulge in crimes, acts of terrorism (damages, cutting telephone 
wires etc.) or robbery will be executed; if aggressors employ force or fire against 
troops and authorities and do not subject to legal summons, use of fire is 
permitted, aiming at liquidating the leaders”7.
1 ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, File 560, vol. 1, RPR – Ministry of Internal Affairs – 
Operative Archives – Subversive organizations and groups, Apateu –Arad, Recording of 
proceedings from 29 August 1949, General Unit of the People’s Security, f. 1.
2 Ibidem, f. 3.
3 Ibidem, ff. 1-23.
4 Ibidem, ff. 19-23.
5 Ibidem, ff. 16-18.
6 ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, File 15, RPR – Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
”Counterrevolutionary kulak actions 1948-1949”, Unit of Security Police, File no. 5628.Sp, Booklet 
no. 1, Account concerning operations of establishing order in the regions of peasant unrest from Arad-
Bihor-Sălaj no. 31.721/6 August 1949, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Troops Commandament, 
Section I, ff. 158-165.
7 Ibidem, f. 161.
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Long-term Measures: Forced Dislocations and Deportations
Secret Police documents state that some of those arrested were released after 
completion of the investigations, but many others were sent to prison or in forced 
labor units or being house arrested in Dobrogea (generally in the region of Constanţa 
county). The following overview of stages of intervention is telling: 
 ”The repressive actions, thus organized and carried out, led to [...] the 
suppression of the rebellion and the punishment of the instigators […] in the 
Oradea region of 16 kulaks were executed, in the Arad region 12 kulaks, all 
heads of rebellion; in both regions, 300 people were taken to Medgidia, Constanţa 
county; in Oradea region there are still 170 persons who are arrested, that have 
still not been investigated; [...] the introduction of law and order in the region”1.
Although decisions which established the labor units, colonies, battalions, and 
forced residence were taken formally in 1950 and 1952 (as previously discussed), 
the quotation above confirms that the dislocations (”evacuations” in the communist 
jargon) existed prior to the issuance of these decisions.
As a mechanism of political violence involving physical assault on individuals, 
dislocation and forced resettlement (deportation in more blunt terms) in other regions 
of Romania was recurrently practiced in the early stages of communist power: ”People 
in the county of Arad who were relocated were taken to Cermei and housed on the 
school premises […] on August 3, 1949, they were shipped in freight trains bound 
for Medgidia, Constanţa county”2. According to a report concerning the elements 
relocated throughout 1949, 439 families in the following regions were relocated in 
1949: Oradea – 336, Baia Mare – 8, Arad – 18, Cluj – 13, Suceava – 16, Bacău – 5, 
Câmpulung – 24 and Mureş – 103. These persons ”were forcibly relocated in Constanţa 
region, being afterwards engaged in unskilled work”4.
The effect was close to that expected by the authorities: 
 ”The forced removals carried out in 1949 after the rebellions that occurred 
had the effect of improving the general attitude in communes, while at the same 
time producing panic among hostile elements and fear among the wealthier 
citizens, which resulted in the change of the strategy used beforehand, that of 
making outright propaganda. The trend among the middle peasantry was to 
join collective farms without, however, being convinced that they are making the 
right choice and working hard”5.
For a certain period of time, the deportations lacked a legal basis, as acknowledged 
by the elites themselves: 
1 Account concerning operations  of establishing order in the regions of peasant unrest from Arad-
Bihor-Sălaj no. 31.721/6 August 1949, ff. 162-163.
2 National Historical Archives, Central Committee Fund – Organizational Section, 
file 71/1949, f. 43, quoted in Nicoleta IONESCU-GURĂ, Dimensiunea represiunii din România în 
regimul comunist...cit., p. 67. 
3 ACNSAS, file 172, ff. 368-369, Ibidem, pp. 82-83.
4 ACNSAS, file 11653, ff. 1-10, Ibidem, p. 83. 
5 Account, 10 August 1951, ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file 11653, f. 252, in Nicoleta 
IONESCU-GURĂ, Dimensiunea represiunii din România în regimul comunist...cit., p. 83.
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 ”Such dislocations do not appear to have been made using legal orders, but 
they were made following orders of superior command […] Dislocation were 
not all made based on established guilt, some of them were made on the basis 
of the material status and following the proposals of former interim committees 
and commanders of militia stations”1.
Apart from the attempt to shift the blame to lower levels, this quotation also 
illustrates the infrastructural problems the regime faced in its early years in power.
Together with their deportation, the peasants’ were also dispossessed of their 
movable and immovable property. Council of Ministers Decision no. 308/1953 provided 
the legal framework for these assets to remain in state ownership2. According to 
Decision 6100/27 July 1955 on the lifting of domiciliary restrictions of relocated elements, 
commissions were organized in 1955 to check the relocated elements, reaching a total 
of 8850 displaced families from Arad, Timişoara and Craiova regions, the majority 
in 1951, who were relocated in the ”special villages” in the Bucharest, Constanţa and 
Galaţi regions: 
 ”Of the 8850 families displaced, we propose lifting residence restrictions 
on a number of 3692 families, while 5055 families are to continue on the same 
restrictions. Of the total of 3692 families for whom proposals to lift residence 
restrictions have been made, for 513 families we have proposed lifting residence 
restrictions with the right to return to the original place of settlement”3.
The lifting of residence restrictions was carried out for the following categories: 
 ”Poor and middle peasants, mistakenly deployed in the kulak category as 
well as former servants of the kulaks deployed with them; those who escaped 
from the USSR, but who are not former exploiters and are not known for hostile 
activity; [...] families in which the one who caused the entire family’s displacement 
has died; old and sick who are unable to provide for themselves and who have 
relatives in other parts of the country that can support them; those relocated as 
suspicious elements and against whom there is no compromising material”4.
Interestingly, however, that among those proposed to remain with ”residence 
restrictions” by these committees were ”[...] elements that participated in the kulak 
rebellions, who instigated and had leadership role in these riots”5. Although the report 
specifies that the references pertain to those displaced during 1951, it is evident from 
this quotation that among those displaced were also those who participated (or their 
families) to the riots in the summer of 1949 in the counties in the northern part of the 
1 Account, 24 March 1951, ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file 172, ff. 21-22, in Ibidem, 
p. 85.
2 Art. 12, in Ibidem, p. 72.
3 Ministry for Internal Affairs, Special Commission for the Verification of Dislocated 
Elements in the New Communes, Report no. 00703883/27.07.1955, in ACNSAS, Documentary 
Fund, File 55, vol. 24, RPR – Ministry of Internal Affairs – Operative Archives –Operative 
Corespondence Fund of the Security, ff. 3-5.
4 Ibidem, f. 3.
5 Ibidem, f. 2.
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country (Arad and Bihor). Secret Police files do not contain clear references to the 
reasons for which those persons had received the sanction of dislocation and house 
arrest1.
Organizational Measures as Riot Outcome 
Peasant riots of 1949 revealed many infrastructural weaknesses in the communist 
institutional structure. Poor quality of the informative work being considered by the 
authorities as one of the leading causes that allowed for the shaping of the peasants’ 
collective actions. One of the immediate consequences of peasant rebellions in Arad 
and Bihor in the summer of 1949 was increased focus on gathering information and 
monitoring civilians, in order ”to know kulak elements with all their activities, past 
and present, and the methods employed by them”2. Thus, “regional Secret Police 
departments established with regional Secret Police and county offices chiefs the need 
to reorganize the surveillance network security in rural areas”3.
The strategies and action plans were clearly designed to prevent the occurrence 
of similar situations. Some clear directions can be identified through which these 
agents of government aimed to strengthen their operational mechanisms. The main 
objective was to increase the control over the peasantry. ”Informative actions” had to 
be strengthened, in order to gain insight into the ”frame of mind” of the peasants and 
to uncover ”class enemy plots”, as well as the way in which the local Party, Secret 
Police and Militia representatives performed their tasks. The structural inefficiencies 
are highlighted in the reports of the Ministry of Interior’s High Command Troops, 
which were drafted in the wake of the peasant rebellion’s suppression: 
 ”The work of persuasion was not organized enough, while the elements 
responsible for carrying out this task had not been sufficiently prepared; seeing 
the existing information, preventive measures were not taken in time”4.
”Security linemen” were appointed in every commune, emphasizing the 
deficiencies to be corrected: 
 ”Persuasion work was not sufficiently organized, and those who performed  
this task were not sufficiently prepared; seeing the existing information, 
preventive measures were not taken in time; [...] work was initially unassertive 
and has decisive actions to suppress were not taken”5.
1 Report no. 1, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Commission for the verification of dislocated 
persons with fixed residence in the new communes, ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, File 55, 
vol. 22, RPR – Operative Archives – Operative Corespondence Fund of the Security, f. 2.
2 ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file 4022, vol. I, f. 100, in Nicoleta IONESCU-GURĂ, 
Dimensiunea represiunii din România în regimul comunist...cit., p. 71.
3 ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file 4022, vol. I, f. 100, in Ibidem, p. 71. 
4 Account concerning operations  of establishing order in the regions of peasant unrest from Arad-
Bihor-Sălaj no. 31.721/6 August 1949, Ministry for Internal Affairs, Troops Commandament, 
Section I, in ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file 15, ”Counterrevolutionary kulak actions 1948-
1949”, Unit of Security Police, file nr. 5628.Sp, Booklet no. 1, f. 164.
5 Ibidem.
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As follows, there would be increased surveillance carried out by bodies whose 
monitoring capacity had proven to be relatively inefficient.
In the attempt to prevent riots similar to those from 1949, prior to the organization 
of the harvesting campaign in 1950, communist authorities intensified the surveillance 
operations in the villages. They decreed the strengthening of 
”informative operations in the rural environment, with the purpose of always 
knowing the exact frame of mind of the peasants […]; the identification of the 
class enemy’s conspiracies and their methods of counteraction; the way in which 
competent bodies responsible for these operations fulfill their duty”1.
Drastic measures were to be taken against 
”hostile elements who instigate villagers not to do the necessary agricultural 
work in the places assigned by the local authorities; incite peasants to not give 
in the fixed rates; instigate or attack the storage places, convoys and warehouses 
where grain is stored; instigate or attack party and state authorities in charge of 
these operations; launch alarmist reports in order to prevent the campaign”2.
An order of the Directorate General of the Secret Police addressed to all Regional 
Units in the country (issued in July 1950) asked for complete reports on the cropping 
campaigns, structured according to certain parameters. Reports were to contain 
references to 
”aggressive mass actions following agitation caused by the enemy or lack of 
tact of state bodies (attacks, arson etc.), non-aggressive mass actions, events that 
include groups of people who manifest their dissatisfaction with the cropping 
and collection process, noisy mass actions, tacit disobedience to give in cropped 
wheat, or [other] quotas, including mass protests [...], isolated, individual actions, 
arson, sabotage, spreading manifestos, [...] the number of complaints submitted 
by peasants in each county”3.
Equally important is, from the same perspective, the Order regarding the actions to 
be taken by the Secret Police representatives in order to resolve in a timely manner the 
grievances expressed by the peasantry, with the purpose of preventing protest events: 
 ”The malfunctions or other various causes that determine changes in the 
frame of mind of the peasantry will be solved on the spot, where appropriate, 
through the referral to the competent bodies to take the necessary measures”4.
1 Security White Book, vol. II, 1994, pp. 232-233; ASRI, Fund ”D”, file no. 8974, vol. 2, 
ff. 84-85, Address of Security Unit in Bucharest regarding its tasks in reorganizing the collection and 
threshing campaign in the summer of 1950, 1 July 1950, in Dan CĂTĂNUŞ, Octavian ROSKE 
(coord.), Colectivizarea agriculturii în România. Represiunea (1949-1953), cit., p. 191.
2 Ibidem. 
3 ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file 7, vol. 4, RPR, State Security Council, Order of the General 
Unit of the People’s Security no. 233/335784 of 6 July 1950 to all regional units in the country, f. 110.
4 ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file 8, vol. 1, RPR – State Security Council, File regarding 
syntheses and orders D.S.C. 1949-1950, Order of the Ministry for Internal Affairs, Unit of Bucharest 
Security office no. 14/3934/20 January 1950, f. 23.
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These examples describe much of the ideological jargon found in the Secret 
Police documents. The attempts to identify the levers of exerting power are obvious. 
The despotic aim found in the content of normative acts dictated by the central 
elites proved somewhat more difficult to implement on a local level. In this sense, 
the documents found in archives of the former Secret Police lead to the conclusion 
that the operations that were part of collectivization process had in many ways a 
deficient organization: mistakes in setting quotas were very common, plough-lands 
were not separated from the non-arable ones, the individual or collective resistance 
and boycotting of the peasants were quite extensive, there was a lack of adequate 
storage space for crops, a lack of security of the warehouse where they were stored, 
a poor organization of the local activists of the Communist Party, a lack of effective 
coordination between the Secret Police and the Militia, an arbitrary setting of quotas 
of grain that were due on land area, not on harvest output etc. The coordinated, 
homogenous and efficient implementation policies dictated from the center largely 
depended on the concrete conditions that existed in Romania’s counties. Moreover, 
there were tensions not only between high-ranking officials at the center, but also 
between them and local party authorities. The situations in the localities where party 
activists tried to implement central directives could not be controlled at any time from 
the center. 
The structure and content of reports submitted by various Secret Police regional 
units to the General Headquarters clearly emphasize the subordinate relationship 
that existed between them, but can also be interpreted as a weakness in the chain of 
command. The relationship of interdependence was clear: to carry out its directives, 
the center depended on the local agents of government (party, Secret Police, militia). 
An example in this sense can be found in a note issued by the General Headquarters 
which emphasized that ”the measures […] taken (the tardy gathering of evidence) 
rather encourage than suppress [the kulaks’] actions”1. Transferring the blame 
for committing illegal acts on the local level, the ”weak political work among the 
poor peasantry”2 was incriminated, as well as the inefficient management of the 
collectivization process by the local authorities: 
 ”Party organizations have undertaken poor political work in villages so that 
poor and middle peasantry could be influenced by the class enemy […] showed 
a lack of vigilance, allowing opportunistic and hostile elements to creep into 
their leadership”3.
By way of conclusion, the central authority was faced in the first decade of its 
accession to power with major institutional challenges. The regime had to penetrate 
(to use the term of Michael Mann) existing structures and shape them according to 
the new guiding ideology. However, while building its infrastructure, it had to rely 
1 ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file 8, vol. 1, RPR – State Security Council, File regarding 
syntheses and orders D.S.C. 1949-1950, Note from the General Unit of the Security to the Bucharest 
Unit no. 145/104.665 – Confidential, Top Secret, ff. 606-607.
2 Informative account of the counterrevolutionary kulak actions in Bihor-Arad, 12 August 1949, 
in Dan CĂTĂNUŞ, Octavian ROSKE (coord.), Colectivizarea agriculturii în România. Represiunea 
(1949-1953), cit., p. 117.
3 Ibidem, pp. 104-118.
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predominantly on the despotic powers which bred a high level of violence against 
the population in its territory. Peasant resistance, although never framed directly as a 
contestation of political power, was perceived by the elites as a threat to its authority 
and legitimacy. Weak in the infrastructural reach that would secure the regime, 
violence was used as a replacement for assuring obedience from the population and 
permanence in power. In the process of consolidating power, elites relied on and 
strengthened what was to become the main pillar of communist power: the institutions 
with repressive functions. This article has briefly illustrated this process by addressing 
the organizational measures that were taken by the elites in strengthening the reach 
of the Secret Police in Romania’s villages in the late 1940s.
CONCLUSIONS
The study of peasant riots in the summer of 1949 in Arad county described the 
mechanisms used by various communist agents of government to repress protest and 
punish those found responsible for ”terrorist actions”: executions, investigations and 
surveillance, psychological pressures, death threats, beatings, evictions, dispossession 
of movable and immovable property, the prohibition on return to the native village, 
the inability to communicate with family members who were in other locations, 
interruption of children’s education, arrests, false accusations, forced labor, famine. 
The analysis of primary sources (documents preserved in the archives of 
the former Secret Police) reflects the rhetorical legitimization of the use of these 
mechanisms: the restoration of social order. It also serves to identify the weaknesses 
of a despotic regime that had not yet developed its infrastructural powers and was 
therefore faced with the gaps in local implementation of its decisions and policies: 
numerous technical problems, poor training of local communist cadres and Secret 
Police representatives, as well as peasant resistance and boycotting of measures 
were significant obstacles that the communist elites sought to minimize by relying 
on political violence as a means of governing. While the ideological and legislative 
components of the regime were relatively well defined during the initial stages of 
regime development, these could not replace the pragmatic functions of the system. 
To make up for the infrastructural weaknesses of the regime that were an obstacle to 
exerting full societal control, the elites strengthened the repressive component and 
used political violence as a leading mechanism of control. 
The structural weaknesses of the communist state – some of which are outlined in 
this article – explain the use of a high level of violence as a political resource of control. 
The stages of collectivization outline din the first section of this article illustrate the 
constant oscillation between ”restriction” and ”violence” as types of state coercion1. 
While the former aims to ”establish parameters within which individuals (victims 
as well as bystanders) modify their behavior in an attempt to avoid sanctions in the 
present and future [...]”2, the latter is intended to ”eliminate a part of society deemed 
unacceptable while compelling acquiescence or guided change within others”3. 
1 Christian DAVENPORT, State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace, Cambridge 
University Press, New York & Cambridge, 2007, pp. 46-47.
2 Ibidem, p. 47.
3 Ibidem.
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Both strategies increase significantly the costs of protest, because the resources and 
opportunities that are available to individuals are drastically reduced and the risks of 
failing actions are among the most severe. 
Although in most cases peasants opposed the mandatory quota system that was 
set arbitrarily and without regard to objective conditions, the communist authorities 
perceived the peasants’ opposition as protests against the political establishment. As 
follows, to the violence of peasants during the riots (involving the destruction of 
Communist Party buildings, the interruption of telephone lines or physical attack 
on some of the local representative of the parties), the communists responded with 
disproportionate violence, engaging militia troops and border guards who possessed 
superior armed resources. The elites were threatened as they were aware of the 
legitimacy gap that existed. This came across glaringly with the opposition of poor 
peasants, regarded as the main ”beneficiaries” of the process of collectivization. 
This explains the constant propagandistic attempts to divert the blame for the 
”hostile manifestations” and ”actions of sabotage and incitement to disorder” on 
the ideologically convenient ”class enemy”: the kulaks. This justification legitimated 
repressive interventions against the protests. 
The ”accusations” that were brought against those who had been identified 
as ”enemies”, ”agitators” or ”instigators” were often unclear and unsubstantiated. 
Most times, however, as evidenced by Secret Police reports or informative notes, 
the ”plots” against the social order were reduced to the free public expression of 
dissatisfaction or grievances about the injustices that took place during the process 
of collectivization. The repressive tactics identified in this article show the existence 
of a management system that incorporated violence as the main mechanism of 
government. Instruments used to neutralize the resistance of those who opposed 
regime practices were perceived as a threat to an already shaky legitimacy, as well 
as the social networks that previously existed. The findings of this article also point 
to a dynamics of the repressive phenomenon that cannot be fully controlled by 
the authorities that initiate it. As such, the combination of decision making at the 
national level, and the implementation conducted by local agents of government that 
implement orders is conducive to unanticipated results that challenge the rhetorical 
defense of regime cohesiveness and intended territorial reach. Punitive actions are 
often disproportionately high compared to the force of the estimated ”danger”. It can 
thus be argued that the regime’s violence acquires ”irrational tendencies” in moments 
of perceived threat, as was the case with peasant riots1. Thus, in an attempt to redefine 
the power relations between state and society, the communist elite used violence as a 
key governing tool, leading to countless abuses. One illustration of the cumulative 
effect of these abuses discussed in this article was the decimation of the workforce 
in agriculture as a result of a large number of imprisonments and forced labour 
sentences. The extensive campaign of arrests of various targets in the class enemies 
marked its institutional incapacity to support the coercive ideological momentum of 
its leaders or field agents (i.e. prisons were insufficient for the number of prisoners 
they received). 
1 In the sense defined by Kenneth JOWITT, in Revolutionary Breakthrough and National 
Development: The Case of Romania, 1944-1965, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, 1971, pp. 97-99.
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Thus outlined, the characteristics of the political violence used by the regime elites 
during the early stages of regime development has a crucial role in understanding the 
communist phenomenon and its impact on the socio-political order in Romania. Political 
violence was manifested through various techniques during the communization 
process and it was the basis that allowed the regime to survive and strengthen its 
infrastructural power Political violence – marked by predominantly physical uses 
during the analyzed period and gaining more psychological connotations later on 
– had the overarching goal of preventing mobilization of critical voices against the 
regime by institutionalizing a state of fear and distrust that would prove near-fatal 
to the articulation of cohesive opposition for nearly five decades. The effects of these 
policies gradually increased the isolation of individuals from the public space and the 
shaping of a political culture dominated by suspicion.
This article has shown that various measures were taken as a result of peasant 
rebellions to consolidate the institutional capacities of the communist regime. Although 
one can easily notice the inability of farmers to organize sustained and repeated 
protests at regional level, their actions being confined to the local level (village or 
commune), Secret Police documents reveal, however, that the power of groups of 
peasants who opposed the agricultural policies of the Communist Party lay not in 
their strength or organization, but in the numbers of protests that took place during 
1949-1962 (be that open collective or individual protest or forms of boycotting quota 
impositions or forced enrollment in collective farms). The consolidation of repressive 
institutions of government grew into a constant feature of regime development. 
Increased infrastructural power allowed the regime to lower its level of political 
violence applied through physical methods (widespread imprisonment and forced 
labour) – which dominated the late 1940s until the early 1960s – and increase the 
psychological use of political violence (through the penetration of society by Secret 
Police networks of surveillance and collaboration). 
The institutions exerting political violence represented the basis of the 
communist regime’s infrastructural power. The years 1951 and 1953 can provide 
a good illustration in this respect. A series of directives of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs (General Directorate of the Secret Police) were issued, which were intended 
to more effectively organize ”work and management of information in the villages”, 
”operational records of hostile elements in the Romanian People’s Republic”, the 
organization of ”informative investigative work of the Ministry of Secret Police 
organs” or to ”improve work with agents”1. These directives – as do many others 
in the coming years – show continuous concern of the communist elite for training 
cadres and consolidating the repressive mechanisms of the Secret Police, those that 
could ensure the consolidation of the infrastructural state power. 
1 These documents can be accessed at www.cnsas.ro/ist_sec.html.
